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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
OVERVIEW
The publication of the previous “Quarterly report” coincided with a surge in volatility on 
financial markets further to the results of the UK referendum, contrary to the country 
remaining a Member State of the European Union (EU). Following that initial reaction, the 
summer months have been characterised by a return to lower levels of volatility, declines 
in interest rates, accompanied by a compression of spreads, and across-the-board 
increases in asset prices, in a setting in which expectations continue to point to 
expansionary monetary policies being maintained over a lengthy period of time. 
In recent months the flow of information relating to global economic activity has broadly 
pointed to its stabilisation, with somewhat more favourable data in the emerging economies 
than in the developed countries. In any event, the growth outlook for the world economy 
remains modest and subject to a high degree of uncertainty, with different sources of risk 
that include the persistence of certain geopolitical tensions and doubts over the capacity 
of the economic authorities, chiefly in some emerging economies, to redress the prevailing 
macrofinancial imbalances in an orderly fashion. 
In the developed economies, the UK vote in favour of leaving the EU appears so far not to 
be entailing high costs in terms of economic activity. That should nonetheless not mask 
the possibility that further, protracted uncertainty about the future UK-EU relationship, in 
terms both of trade and other areas, and the final shape of the arrangements reached, may 
ultimately affect economic developments significantly in both areas. 
In the euro area, the ECB projections presented this month envisage a continuation of the 
current moderate cyclical upturn, albeit at a slightly lesser pace than that considered in the 
Eurosystem’s June projections, as a result of the worsening outlook for export markets, 
linked above all to the adverse impact of the UK referendum result. In the inflation domain, 
the ECB continues to project a gradual acceleration in the core component from its current 
low levels as cyclical slack progressively diminishes. 
The information available on the Spanish economy points to a continuation of the 
expansionary course of activity, at a quarter-on-quarter rate in Q3 which is expected to be 
0.7%. If confirmed, this figure would be 0.1 pp down on that observed in each of the four 
previous quarters (see Chart 1). The contribution of the net external balance to GDP growth 
in Q3 is estimated to have been lower than that observed in Q2, when exports performed 
very positively despite the sluggish global setting. 
In 2016 as a whole, GDP growth in the Spanish economy is expected to rise to 3.2%, an 
upward revision of 0.4 pp on the June projections (see Box 1). Behind this revision lies 
both the more favourable course of activity in Q2 compared with expectations in June, and 
the improved outlook for the rest of the year, judging by the information available. 
In the two years spanning 2017-18, the expansion of the Spanish economy is expected to 
run further, continuing to be underpinned by comfortable financial conditions associated 
with the prolongation of the expansionary monetary policy stance, by the headway in the 
ongoing deleveraging by private agents (meaning that additional reductions in indebtedness 
have an increasingly less adverse impact on activity), and, as the projection period unfolds, 
by the foreseeable strengthening of export markets. However, the diminished momentum 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 4 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, SEPTEMBER 2016 QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
of some of the factors supporting activity recently, such as the fall in oil prices, the 
depreciation of the euro and the expansionary fiscal policy, will prompt a reduction in the 
pace at which the economy is increasing. 
Specifically, GDP growth is estimated to stand at 2.3% and 2.1% in 2017 and 2018, respectively, 
rates unchanged on the June projections. In the specific case of next year, the absence of 
changes is the outcome of two opposing and mutually offsetting forces. On one hand, the 
improved estimated growth rate for 2016 incorporates a positive carryover effect on the rate 
from next year. On the other, the change from June to September in the set of assumptions 
underlying the projections has a negative net impact on expected growth in 2017. In turn, this 
is the result of the downward revision of the rate of increase of export markets (chiefly reflecting 
expected lower imports in the United Kingdom), which is offset only in part by the reduction in 
resident agents’ borrowing costs, prompted by the recent cuts in interest rates. 
In terms of the composition of demand, a notable change in the 2017-18 period is the 
reduction in the foreseeable contribution of private consumption. Indeed, although this will 
continue to be underpinned by the prolongation of the strong pace of job creation, the 
expansion of household income, in real terms, will be less pronounced than in the recent 
past owing to the petering out of the factors that had temporarily been boosting it. Business 
spending, for its part, will slow in line with final demand, although financial conditions are 
expected to remain favourable. Finally, the contribution of exports to GDP growth will be 
slightly lower than that observed this year, given the worsening external environment, due 
in part to the Spanish economy’s trade exposure to the United Kingdom, the recipient of a 
sizeable portion of Spanish exports of tourist and non-tourist services. 
Turning to the labour market, jobs are expected to continue to be created at a high rate during 
the projection period, with low growth in apparent labour productivity, as is habitual in upturns 
in the Spanish economy. Job creation will allow further reductions in the unemployment rate, 
which is expected to stand at slightly below 17% of the labour force at end-2018. 
As to prices, it is estimated that the CPI, after slipping 0.3% in 2016, might grow by around 
1.5% in 2017 and by a further 0.1 pp in 2018, in line with the projected recovery for oil 
prices and the expected gradual rise in core inflation. Set against the June projections, the 
expected growth of the overall CPI rises by 0.3 pp and 0.1 pp in 2016 and 2017, respectively, 
essentially as a result of the upward revision in the path of oil prices. 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND CONSUMER PRICES (a) CHART 1
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a Year-on-year rates of change based on seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP and on original series in that of the consumer price indices.
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The risks surrounding the baseline scenario for GDP growth remain tilted, as in June, to the 
downside. Compounding the external risks described are others stemming from the 
prolongation of the period of interim government in Spain, which generates uncertainty 
about the future course of economic policies and, in particular, about the fiscal consolidation 
path and the potential budgetary measures needed to meet the budget deficit targets 
agreed by the European Council in August for the coming years. In this respect, any delay 
in the scheduled correction of the budgetary imbalance, compliance with which is vital for 
entrenching the sustainability of public finances, and in the approval of structural reforms, 
needed to raise potential growth, increases the vulnerability of the economy in the face of 
potential exogenous shocks. 
Conversely, the strength shown by the Spanish economy in the recent phase, against the 
background of uncertainty described, suggests that activity retains a degree of inertia that 
would lead to the impact of the foregoing factors of risk being mitigated in the short term. 
Moreover, in a setting in which knowledge about the effects of the broad set of monetary 
policy measures set in train by the ECB is necessarily limited, in light of the novel nature of 
such measures, the impact on the baseline scenario might be greater than that considered.
In relation to inflation, the risks of deviation are considered to be moderately tilted to the 
downside, as a result of a hypothetical materialisation of a more unfavourable global 
growth scenario. Nonetheless, the expansionary monetary policy measures might drive 
inflation above the baseline scenario projection. 
The Report contains six boxes. These present the Banco de España’s new macroeconomic 
projections (Box 1); a description of the latest public finances developments (Box 2); an 
analysis of the impact of the UK’s exit from the EU on the British and world economy (Box 
3); a study of the effects of the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) on the cost 
and volumes of euro area issues (Box 4); a description of the Spanish economy’s exposure 
to the United Kingdom (Box 5); and an analysis of the factors behind the recent course of 
the Spanish economy’s participation rate (Box 6).
23.9.2016.
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2014 2015 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
National Accounts
Quarter-on-quarter rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
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9.02.00.16.02.10.14.17.36.1)b( dnamed lanoitan fo noitubitnoC    
1.0-6.02.0-2.04.0-0.05.0-5.0-2.0-)b( dnamed lanretxe ten fo noitubitnoC    
Year-on-year rates of change
    Employment 1.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.0 3.2 2.9 2.8
    CPI -0.2 -0.5 -0.7 0.1 -0.9 0.0 -0.8 -0.8 -0.1
9.06.01.19.08.06.02.06.00.0secirp doof dessecorpnu dna ygrene .lcxe IPC    
Price indicators (year-on-year change in end-of-period data) (c)
MAIN MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY (a) TABLE 1
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 23 September 2016
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP (pp).
c Latest available figure for consumer price indices: August 2016.
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This box presents the Banco de España’s latest macroeconomic 
projections, updating those published on 7 June.1 The new projections 
include the information that has come to light between 18 May and 
23 September, the respective cut-off dates for the previous and current 
exercises (see Table 1).2 One specific and significant change arises in 
the latest Quarterly National Accounts (QNA) estimates, which include 
the data for the first two quarters of 2016 (these were not available at 
the time the projections published in June were prepared).3
The estimates point to the continuation throughout the projection 
period of the expansionary phase of the Spanish economy. This 
development will be assisted by a series of different factors, 
including some that have conferred a high degree of sustainability 
on the expansion (including most notably the correction, over 
recent years, of imbalances such as the loss of external 
competitiveness), along with others that entail a greater or lesser 
degree of temporariness, such as the improvements in resident 
agents’ financial conditions, largely supported by monetary policy 
conduct, the expansionary fiscal policy stance applied in the two 
years spanning 2015-2016 and the delayed effects of the recently 
observed fall in oil prices and depreciation of the euro. Specifically, 
it is estimated that GDP will grow by 3.2% this year, slowing to 
2.3% and 2.1% in 2017 and 2018, respectively (see Table 2), as a 
result of the disappearance of a significant portion of the 
temporary impulses listed. Turning to consumer prices, after 
posting a fall of -0.3% in 2016 on average, they are expected to 
rise to 1.5% and 1.6% in each of the next two years, driven by 
higher oil prices and by the progressive reduction in cyclical 
slack.
The main change from the June to the September exercise in 
the assumptions underlying the projections is the downward 
revision in the expected rate of expansion of the Spanish 
economy’s external markets. This is chiefly a consequence of 
the estimated impact on UK imports arising from this country’s 
referendum to remain in or exit the European Union and, to a 
lesser extent, of a downward reassessment of the growth rate 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018)
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International environment
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    countries (c) (2000=100 and pp changes) 113.0 114.2 114.8 114.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7
1.0-0.00.04.0-3.0-3.0-0.0)b( )robiruE htnom-3( setar tseretni mret-trohS    
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September 2016 projection
Changes from the June 2016 
projection
Table 1
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONDITIONS (a)
Annual rates of change, unless otherwise indicated
SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Assumptions cut-off date: 19 September 2016. Figures in levels are annual averages and the percentage rates are calculated on the basis of the related annual 
averages.
b For the projection period, the values in the table are technical assumptions, prepared following the Eurosystem’s methodology. These assumptions are based on 
the prices on futures markets or on approximations thereto, and they should not be interpreted as a Eurosystem forecast about the course of these variables.
c A positive percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate denotes an appreciation of the euro.
1  Available in this link.
2  The respective cut-off dates for information-gathering in respect of the 
assumptions are 10 May and 19 September, except in the case of 
developments in Spain’s export markets, for which the assumptions for 
the current exercise are taken from the September 2016 ECB staff 
macroeconomic projections for the euro area, produced by ECB staff 
members, whose cut-off date is 15 August. 
3  INE has also published in September a revision of the Annual National 
Accounts series for the period 2012-2015, which revises downwards the real 
GDP growth rate for the first of these years and leaves the rest unchanged, 
and it sets out, in cumulative terms, a higher contribution of external demand 
to GDP growth (at the expense of less robust national demand). These 
annual series have not been used for the preparation of the current 
projections, given that the methodology employed requires the use of 
quarterly series and INE will not disclose the series with this frequency 
consistent with the annual data now published until 24 November.
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of world trade.4 Moreover, compared with the June forecasts, a 
somewhat higher level of oil prices is projected, in line with the 
observed trend on the spot and futures markets for this 
commodity. It is further estimated that competitors’ prices will 
grow somewhat less than expected three months ago, despite 
the slight depreciation of the euro since then. Finally, there will 
be a further reduction in the cost of credit financing to 
households and non-financial corporations, prompted by the 
downward revision of the expected interest-rate paths on 
interbank and government debt markets, according to the 
expectations implied in the yield curve. Moreover, in the case of 
firms a reduction in the cost of financing received via securities 
issues is included, which reflects in part the effects of the 
launch of the corporate sector purchase programme (CSPP) by 
the ECB (see Box 4).
The fiscal policy assumptions for 2016 rest on the measures 
approved in the budgets of the different tiers of government for 
this year, as in June, and on the budget outturn figures available. 
However, none of the further measures announced have been 
included, such as that relating to the re-establishment of minimum 
amounts for corporate income tax prepayments, given the failure 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018) (cont’d)
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
Latest QNA figure: 2016 Q2.
a Projections cut-off date: 23.09.2016.
b Difference, to one decimal place, between GDP growth and the contribution of net external demand.
c Excludes aid to financial institutions.
September 2016 projection
Changes from the June 2016 
projection
2015 2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018
0.00.04.01.23.22.32.3PDG
0.02.04.05.10.24.31.3noitpmusnoc etavirP
1.01.0-1.0-8.08.00.17.2noitpmusnoc tnemnrevoG
4.0-7.0-7.0-5.48.40.44.6noitamrof latipac dexif ssorG
0.1-5.0-2.0-7.56.69.72.01tnempiuqe ni tnemtsevnI    
2.0-2.1-3.1-4.42.41.23.5noitcurtsnoc ni tnemtsevnI    
2.0-3.0-9.08.45.43.54.5secivres dna sdoog fo stropxE
4.0-6.0-1.09.49.44.55.7secivres dna sdoog fo stropmI
National demand (contribution to growth) (b) 3.7 3.1 2.3 2.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1
Net external demand (contribution to growth) -0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
1.0-0.03.07.33.35.38.3PDG lanimoN
1.0-0.01.0-6.11.13.06.0rotalfed PDG
1.0-1.03.06.15.13.0-5.0-)IPC( xedni ecirp remusnoC
CPI excl. energy and unprocessed food prices 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 -0.1
0.00.04.08.10.29.20.3)stnelaviuqe emit-lluf( tnemyolpmE
Unemployment rate (% of labour force)
End-of-period data 20.9 19.0 17.8 16.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.6
Unemployment rate (% of labour force)
Average data 22.1 19.8 18.3 17.1 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6
Net lending (+)/net borrowing (–) of the nation (% of GDP) 2.1 2.6 2.2 1.9 0.6 0.7 0.7
General government net lending (+)/net borrowing (–)  
(% of GDP) (c) -5.0 -4.9 -3.6 -3.1 -0.8 -0.2 -0.2
Table 2
PROJECTIONS OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY'S MAIN MACRO-MAGNITUDES (a)
Annual rate of change in volume terms and % of GDP
4  In the projections for the United Kingdom it is assumed that the 
referendum outcome will give rise to a significant downward revision of 
household and business spending, as a prolonged stage of uncertainty 
commences. This reduction in demand, along with the depreciation of 
sterling, will prompt a significant decline in British imports, which affects 
Spanish exports (along with the second-round effects via third markets). 
Following the referendum, a notable downward revision has been 
observed in the expected path of long-term interest rates which, in part, 
might be related to the referendum result, in so far as it reflects 
expectations of monetary policy easing. For further details on the way in 
which the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU impacts the projections for 
Spain and for the rest of the euro area, see Box 1 in September 2016 
ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area. 
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to specify such amounts at the time these forecasts were 
formulated (see Box 2). With regard to 2017 and 2018, the fact that 
the preparatory cycle for the budgets of the different tiers of 
government has not been set in train means that there is a high 
degree of uncertainty about how budgetary policy will be 
specifically formulated. Against this background, it has been 
decided to prepare a scenario that involves assuming a neutral 
fiscal policy stance. Specifically, it is assumed that budget items 
subject to a greater degree of discretionality (e.g. inputs or public 
investment) will move in line with the (nominal) trend growth 
projections for the economy. Notwithstanding this assumption, the 
forecast for public revenues and the dynamics underlying certain 
expenditure items, such as that earmarked for the payment of 
unemployment benefits, are derived from the forecast 
macroeconomic aggregates. In-house estimates are also made of 
demographic trends, with an impact on pension spending, and of 
the debt interest burden. The fiscal policy stance derived from the 
projections in this report is expansionary in 2016 (for which year a 
deterioration in the primary structural balance of close to 1 pp of 
GDP is estimated, similar to that estimated for 2015) and, in 
accordance with the foregoing criterion, it is neutral in 2017-18. 
Compared with the projections published over three months back, 
the GDP growth forecast in 2016 has been revised upwards by 
0.4  pp. This revision for the current year incorporates the more 
favourable course of activity in Q2, according to QNA results, 
compared with what had been anticipated in June. Moreover, the 
conjunctural information for the summer months suggests a more 
dynamic behaviour of activity in the second half of the year than 
was projected in the previous exercise. 
The growth envisaged for 2017 remains unchanged, which is the 
outcome of two opposing effects. As regards the technical 
assumptions, the less favourable outlook for the behaviour of 
export markets and, to a lesser extent, competitors’ lower prices 
and higher oil prices entail, overall, unfavourable consequences 
for activity which are offset only in part by the additional easing in 
financial conditions that private agents face. Further, this is not 
ultimately reflected in a lower average GDP growth rate for the 
coming year, as it is offset by a more favourable carryover effect 
for 2016.5 In 2018, the changes in the external assumptions exert, 
overall, a neutral impact on activity. 
The expansion in GDP throughout the projection period is 
explained by the buoyancy of national demand which, however, 
will tend to be less robust as from the coming year. Net external 
demand, whose contribution to GDP growth was negative in the 
period 2014-2015, will make an approximately neutral or slightly 
positive contribution over the time horizon envisaged. 
Among the components of national demand, household spending 
on goods and services will continue to show notable strength in 
the short term. Subsequently, the high rate of job creation will 
continue to underpin this spending component, although the 
disappearance of the effects of some temporary factors that have 
been supporting household income in the recent period (and 
which include, in particular, the decline in oil prices and the 
reductions in income tax that came into force in 2015) are expected 
to contribute to tempering the rate of increase of private 
consumption. As a result, following the projected increase of 3.4% 
this year, a slowdown to 2% in 2017 and to 1.5% in 2018 is 
expected. 
Favourable developments on the labour market and the 
persistence of benign financing conditions will prove conducive to 
the continuation of the course of recovery of residential investment. 
The increases in the pace of housing starts and house sales 
recently observed are along these lines. Notwithstanding the 
propitious context described, the intensity of the rise in this 
demand component will be checked by the prospect that the net 
household creation figures will be modest and, possibly, in some 
regions, by the high stock of unsold housing.
Business investment in capital goods will continue to expand at a 
high though diminishing rate, in step with the easing in the 
dynamism of final demand, in a setting in which financial conditions 
are expected to continue to be conducive to spending by non-
financial corporations. The slowdown under the heading of other 
construction, prompted for reasons similar to those described in 
the case of investment in equipment, will be mitigated by the 
assumption made that the level of the public investment 
components will stabilise in 2017, after the fall-off observed in 
2016. 
As regards exports, which have recently moved on a very 
favourable trajectory, the moderate dynamism of external markets 
(and, to a lesser extent, lower competitors’ prices) will give rise to 
somewhat more modest rates of increase. However, sales abroad 
are expected to continue showing a more expansionary course 
than the markets on which they are targeted, owing to the gains in 
competitiveness accumulated in the past (and which are not 
projected to continue in the future) and to the sustained increase 
in the number of firms which, having initiated export activity in a 
specific external market, remain present in such markets after 
several years. Furthermore, it is estimated that the tourism 
component will continue to be boosted by the political instability 
and the security problems in some of Spain’s Mediterranean 
competitors. The course of imports will be determined by the 
slowdown in the main components of final demand. 
On the estimates made, the surplus on the rest-of-the-world 
account may rise to 2.6% of GDP in 2016, 0.5 pp up on 2015, 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018) (cont’d)
5  The carryover effect denotes the arithmetic contribution that the quarter-
on-quarter growth rates of one year exert on the annual average growth 
rate of the following year. On this occasion, specifically, the estimated 
contribution of the quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates in 2016 to the 
average growth of this variable in 2017 is now greater than was estimated 
in June. On one hand, as indicated, the behaviour of activity was more 
expansionary in 2016 Q2 than expected in June. Moreover, on the other 
hand, the present projections include an upward revision of expected 
growth in the final two quarters of this year. In mechanical terms, this 
gives a higher increase in GDP not only in 2016 but also in 2017.
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underpinned by the favourable trend of trade flows in real terms, 
the previous fall in oil prices and the lower net interest charge paid 
abroad. In subsequent years, the nation’s lending capacity may be 
expected to ease as a result of the higher level of oil prices. 
With regard to the labour market, the high pace of job generation 
is expected to persist, with low growth in apparent labour 
productivity, as is habitual in expansionary phases in the Spanish 
economy. The buoyancy of employment will be underpinned, 
moreover, by the projected continuation of wage moderation, 
which will contribute to the maintenance of modest though rising 
rates of increase in unit labour costs. The growth of employment 
will lead to further declines in the unemployment rate, which will 
be strengthened by a downward revision of the estimated growth 
of the labour force related to population ageing, as is set out in 
greater detail in Box 6.
Inflation, measured by the rate of change of consumer prices, has 
been rising since the spring, exhibiting increasingly less negative 
rates. This has essentially been the result of the increase in oil 
prices, although the indices that exclude the energy component – 
and, in particular, the index excluding unprocessed food and 
energy – have recently begun to show signs of picking up.
The CPI index excluding unprocessed food and energy is expected 
to continue quickening over the projection period, as a result of 
the prolongation of the period of expansion in spending on 
consumer goods, the gradual closing of the output gap and, 
towards the end of the projection horizon, the above-mentioned 
moderate rise in unit labour costs. As regards the energy 
component, and under the assumptions for the exercise, the 
recent quickening phase is projected to run into the coming 
months, with increasingly higher rates of change that will peak in 
spring 2017, slowing subsequently. 
As a result of the course of the various components, the overall 
indicator is expected to start posting increasingly positive rates as 
from September this year, which would nevertheless not prevent a 
fall-off of -0.3% being observed for 2016 on average. In 2017 and 
2018, respective increases of 1.5 % and 1.6 % are estimated, in a 
setting in which the overall effect of the changes in the assumptions 
on the inflation rate is slightly negative, which explains the 0.1 pp 
downward revision in 2018 with respect to the June projections. 
Chart 1 shows the year-on-year growth paths for GDP and for the 
CPI index excluding energy and unprocessed food under the 
baseline scenario, along with a measure of uncertainty surrounding 
these paths, constructed drawing on the past deviations of 
projections with respect to the figures actually observed. Under 
this approach, the probability that declines in GDP may be 
observed towards the end of the projection horizon would be 
around 10%, while the probability of the CPI index excluding 
unprocessed food and energy posting negative rates from now to 
end-2018 is very low according to the deviations in past 
projections. These probabilities have not undergone substantial 
changes from the June projections exercise. 
A limitation of this type of approach based on past forecasting 
deviations is that it ignores the possibility that, at a specific point 
in time, the perceived level of uncertainty may be higher than at 
BOX 1MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018) (cont’d)
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
Latest figure: 2016 Q2 for GDP and August 2016 for the CPI excluding energy and unprocessed food prices.
a The right- and left-hand charts show the uncertainty around the central projection. Intervals with probabilities of 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 90%, respectively, 
based on historical projection errors.
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others, or that the risks may appear more likely in one direction 
than in the opposite direction. In this respect, in the present 
projections exercise it is considered that the risks surrounding the 
baseline scenario for GDP growth will, as in June, remain tilted to 
the downside. 
From the standpoint of the external environment, doubts remain in 
some emerging economies in particular concerning their ability to 
redress in an orderly fashion some of the imbalances observed. 
Moreover, in these projections it has been assumed that the 
impact on the baseline scenario of British voters’ decision to exit 
the EU will be manifest only through a downward revision of UK 
imports, meaning that the referendum outcome will not have direct 
adverse consequences on euro area agents’ confidence and 
spending decisions. However, it cannot be ruled out that, during the 
negotiation of the new trading arrangements between the United 
Kingdom and the EU, certain adverse effects of this type not 
envisaged in the baseline scenario may materialise. 
External risks also include a potential stepping up of global 
geopolitical tensions, which might harm both world trade and euro 
area agents’ confidence. In addition, the foreseeable tightening of 
monetary policy in the United States might exert certain adverse 
consequences on the net capital flows received by the most 
vulnerable emerging economies. Further, although the normalisation 
of financial conditions in the euro area in train since late 2012 
appears to be firmly embedded, this process might not be 
completely immune to any potential increase in the perception of 
risks to the banking sector in certain countries in the area. 
Conversely, it cannot be ruled out that the impact on activity of the 
set of monetary policy measures deployed by the ECB may be 
greater than envisaged in these projections, owing to possible 
delays in the transmission of some of them to real activity. 
Regarding domestic risks, the stability of GDP growth throughout 
the present exercise reflects the fact that the possible adverse 
effects arising from the prolongation of the current interim status 
of the government may have been offset during this period by 
other factors. Yet it cannot be ruled out that the adverse effects in 
question may ultimately materialise. In particular, the provisional 
nature of the central executive power has consequences for the 
budgetary process (as set out in Box 2) and, generally, for 
legislative activity, which may ultimately affect private agents’ 
confidence and, therefore, their consumption, investment and 
hiring decisions.
In the fiscal policy arena, the macroeconomic projections have, as 
indicated, been prepared on the basis of the absence of additional 
budgetary measures in the current exercise and under the 
assumption of a neutral fiscal policy stance in respect of activity 
during these years. Under these assumptions, the budget deficit is 
expected to exceed the fiscal targets agreed with the EU Council last 
August, thereby illustrating the need for fiscal policy to resume a 
restrictive stance in order to strengthen the sustainability of public 
finances and to ensure compliance with the targets. Any such 
additional budgetary consolidation measures could entail some cost 
in terms of growth over the course of the projection horizon. 
The extended delay in forming a Spanish government also affects 
the timing of the approval of the structural reforms needed to 
increase the economy’s potential growth. Any delay along these 
lines has adverse consequences for activity, since there are usually 
considerable lags between the adoption of the measures and the 
time at which such measures begin to have palpable effects. 
Conversely, the resilience recently demonstrated by the economy, 
despite the prevailing uncertainty surrounding economic policies 
and the materialisation of certain significant risks in the external 
environment, suggests that the dynamics of activity in our country 
retain a high degree of inertia which, should this hold for some 
time longer, might lessen the final incidence of the foregoing 
factors of risk. 
In terms of inflation, it is considered that the balance of risks is 
moderately tilted to the downside. In particular, the materialisation 
of any of the adverse events described affecting activity might give 
rise to a fresh disinflationary impulse, in particular under those 
scenarios in which external markets might perform less favourably, 
possibly accompanied by declines in commodities prices and an 
appreciation of the euro. Moreover, the recent situation of very low 
inflation rates might tend to be prolonged should agents 
extrapolate the trend observed to their expectations-formation 
process. Conversely, these risks would be alleviated if the 
expansionary monetary policy measures were to give rise to more 
buoyant consumer prices than was described under the baseline 
scenario. 
BOX 1 MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS FOR THE SPANISH ECONOMY (2016‑2018) (cont’d)
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GENERAL GOVERNMENT’S FISCAL PERFORMANCE
The latest figures published on general government’s performance in 
national accounts terms cover the period from January to July 2016 
and refer to central government, regional governments and the Social 
Security.1 According to the national accounts, these subsectors 
registered a combined deficit of 3.1% of GDP2 in January-July, in line 
with the data for the same period in 2015 (see Chart 1). Information 
for the most recent period refers to central government and shows it 
to have registered a deficit of 2.8% of GDP in the period to August. 
This represents a deterioration of three tenths of a percent of GDP 
relative to the same period the previous year. Information is also 
available to August for tax revenues shared by central government, 
the regional governments and local authorities in budgetary 
accounting terms. This shows a smaller drop than at the end of the 
second quarter. Taken together, these developments highlight the risk 
of failing to meet this year’s deficit target.
The general government debt-to-GDP ratio barely changed in the 
second quarter of 2016, at 100.5%, as a result of the slight 
increase in the sector’s liabilities being offset by GDP growth (see 
Charts 2 and 3).3 In conjunction with the reduction in average 
borrowing costs, this trend further lightened the interest burden, 
1  These are monthly national accounts figures published by the National 
Audit Office (IGAE).
2  Net of the funds dedicated to the assistance of financial institutions.
3  The debt-to-GDP ratio was calculated using nominal GDP published by 
the National Statistics Institute (INE) in the latest quarterly national 
accounts (25 August) in the denominator. It does not, therefore, 
incorporate the INE’s update to the 2012-2015 Annual National Accounts 
on 14 September 2016.
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GENERAL GOVERNMENT’S FISCAL PERFORMANCE (cont’d)
which shrank to 3% of GDP. The breakdown by instruments 
reveals the issuance of medium and long-term securities to have 
remained general government’s main channel for borrowing in the 
second quarter.  By holders, the main net purchasers of securities 
issued by central government during the period were domestic 
financial institutions other than credit institutions, and in particular, 
the Banco de España, which made net purchases worth 
€21.9 billion, primarily as part of the Eurosystem asset purchase 
programme.  By contrast, non-residents, credit institutions, 
households, and non-financial corporations reduced their holdings 
of these instruments.
On the institutional level, it should be recalled that on 12  July 
2016 the Council of the European Union decided that Spain had 
taken insufficient measures to correct its excessive deficit in 
2016. This deadline for Spain to reduce the public deficit to 2.8% 
of GDP in 2016 was set in the Council Recommendation of 
21 June 2013. The Council Decision legally bound the European 
Commission to propose a fine, and suspend certain commitments 
regarding the execution of European Structural and Investment 
Funds in 2017. Nevertheless, availing itself of the option provided 
for by the Stability and Growth Pact, on 27 July 2016 the 
Commission proposed to the Council that the fine be cancelled, 
in the light of the reasoned application submitted by the Spanish 
government, which referred to the difficult economic climate, the 
reform efforts made, and the commitment to comply with the 
Pact. The Council decided to follow this recommendation on 
8 August. The resolution on the partial suspension of the structural 
funds is currently pending discussion between the European 
Parliament and the Commission.
As recommended by the Commission, the Council also extended 
the deadline for Spain to correct its excessive deficit by two 
years, to 2018. The new path for the deficit targets sets a 
maximum deficit of 4.6% of GDP this year, 3.1% of GDP in 2017, 
and 2.2% of GDP in 2018. The Spanish Government, like all the 
members of the European Union, is due to submit its annual 
budgetary plan for 2017 by 15 October 2016, and to give notice 
of the effective steps it plans to take to ensure compliance with 
the new deficit path. In particular, the reasoned request by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Competitiveness in reply to the 
Council Decision of 12 July 2016 proposed the reinstatement of 
minimum amounts for corporate income tax prepayments as a 
possible corrective measure.
Full compliance with these European requirements is severely 
constrained by central government’s current caretaker status. 
Indeed, the lack of an agreement enabling a government to be 
formed has meant that the budgetary process has not yet begun. 
Likewise, neither the new path for the public deficit targets agreed 
by the European Council in August, nor the distribution of the 
deficit across the various levels of government, have been 
formally adopted by the Spanish authorities. Specifically, in the 
current year this fact gives rise to the practical difficulty of 
identifying the reference objectives for the application of the 
monitoring and control mechanisms laid down by the Budgetary 
Stability Law, and, in particular, the criteria for the release of funds 
linked to the Regional Government Liquidity Fund.  According to 
the Spanish Constitution, if no new budget has been passed by 
1 January 2017, the 2016 budget will be extended. On the basis 
of past extensions to the General State Budget, it is possible that 
the Spanish parliament may approve amendments to certain 
specific items, such as an increase to pensions or public-sector 
employees’ salaries.4
4  Since the current constitutional regime was established, the General 
State Budget has been extended on four occasions, namely in 1982, 
1989, 1995 and 2011.
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IMPACT OF THE UK’S EXIT FROM THE EU ON THE BRITISH AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES
The UK referendum result to leave the European Union (EU) opens 
up a new scenario for the British economy, which may have 
significant consequences on the EU as a whole and, to a lesser 
extent, on the world economy. The lack of clear references 
regarding the model of the future relationship with the EU to be 
sought by the UK in the negotiation process – continued 
membership of the European Economic Area (EEA), free trade 
agreements similar to the agreement with Switzerland or bilateral 
trade agreements under the aegis of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), among other possibilities – and the doubts as to how the 
negotiations will develop, and how long they will last, present a 
highly uncertain picture in the short and medium term.
As indicated in the main body of this report, the days after the 
referendum were marked by widespread stock market declines 
and sterling depreciation, as the pound fell by some 10% against 
both the dollar and the euro. However, following the initial turmoil, 
many of these moves reversed and most stock indices rose above 
their pre-referendum levels, in a setting marked by a recovery in 
risk appetite and lower volatility. The steps taken by the monetary 
authorities, including the Bank of England (which adopted a 
package of stimulus measures) and other central banks (which 
continued with their accommodative monetary policy), helped to 
ease the initial tensions. Nevertheless, between July and 
September, international bodies and institutions and also private 
sector analysts revised down their activity forecasts for the British 
economy, and for other, mainly European, economies, which are 
those with the closest links to the UK (see Table 1).
The UK’s exit from the EU is expected to have various adverse 
effects on the British economy. Thus, although the markets have 
shown considerable resilience to date, over a one or two-year 
horizon financial conditions may tighten and asset prices may 
decline, especially in the real estate sector. Such developments, 
together with a deterioration in agents’ confidence, which will 
foreseeably be erratic over the coming months, would have a 
negative impact on domestic demand. On the positive side, 
sterling depreciation will provide an initial boost to competitiveness, 
partially offsetting those effects, assisted also by the more 
expansionary monetary policy stance and, farther ahead, by the 
more moderate fiscal policy adjustment. Although there will be no 
changes in tariffs or other non-tariff barriers until the UK actually 
leaves the EU, there could be a decline in trade in the near term 
given the uncertainty surrounding future trade relations, insofar as 
the possible future loss of markets may prompt a shift in global 
production processes. Longer term, it is difficult to foresee the 
effects on productive capacity in the UK since they will largely 
depend on the new trade and financial relationship that is finally 
agreed with the EU and with other key areas such as the US and 
the Asian economies.
The role of the British economy as a global financial centre and a 
hub for multinationals’ investment flows – largely owing to the 
access it provides to the Single Market – entails the potential risk 
that any shocks affecting the British economy may spread to the 
international financial markets. This could lead to a tightening of 
financial conditions and a drop in confidence, and to spending 
decisions in the economies most exposed to the British economy 
being put on hold. In turn, the UK’s trading partners will be 
adversely affected by the lower level of activity in the UK, although 
in some cases there could also be a positive impact as a result of 
activities being relocated outside the UK.
In recent months numerous studies have attempted to quantify the 
impact of the UK’s exit from the EU both on the British economy 
and the rest of the world, envisaging different scenarios as to the 
UK’s future relationship with the other economies and as to the 
effect of the uncertainty on financial conditions and agents’ 
SOURCES: OECD, IMF, European Commission and UK Treasury.
a Figures refer to 2017.
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IMPACT OF THE UK’S EXIT FROM THE EU ON THE BRITISH AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES (cont.)
confidence. Broadly speaking, the scenarios considered range 
from “limited impact”, with most current trade relations being 
maintained, through to “adverse impact”, with the UK becoming 
subject to WTO rules. These studies estimate the impact on the 
British economy as a decline in GDP of between 1% and 6% in 
2018, according to the scenario and assumptions considered (see 
Chart 1), illustrating the high level of uncertainty surrounding the 
future process of cutting ties with the EU and the possible 
economic implications. The consequences for the euro area and 
the world economy should be significantly more subdued, 
although naturally there will be substantial differences between 
countries, according to how close their ties are to the UK (see 
Box  5 for a description of the Spanish economy’s trade and 
financial exposure to the UK).
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CORPORATE DEBT ISSUES FOLLOWING THE LAUNCH OF THE ECB’S CSPP
The Governing Council of the ECB announced a new corporate 
sector purchase programme (CSPP) in March 2016, in addition to 
the other three ongoing programmes under its asset purchase 
programme (APP).1 The initiative, which was part of a broad 
package of new expansionary monetary policy measures2, aimed 
to help reduce the cost of issues and strengthen the APP’s impact 
on financial conditions in the euro-area economy.
Under the CSPP, the Eurosystem buys corporate sector bonds, 
specifically, euro-denominated securities with an investment-grade 
credit rating issued by non-banking corporations established in the 
euro area.3 In order to be eligible, the remaining maturity must be 
between 6 months and 30 years and there is no minimum issuance 
volume.4 Purchases began on 8 June and reached a cumulative volume 
of nearly €23 billion over the three months the programme has been in 
operation. Monthly purchases of corporate bonds, averaging €6 billion 
euros over the period to August, have accounted for between 7% and 
11% of total monthly purchases under the APP in this period. Although 
quantitatively less significant, in line with the size of the private non-
bank bond markets in the euro area, its relative impact is high.
The announcement of the CSPP has had a highly positive impact 
on the cost of corporate bonds in the euro area. As Chart 1 shows, 
the yield on BBB issues by non-financial corporations has dropped 
by more than a percentage point relative to values in February, 
falling to record lows, making this form of borrowing cheaper than 
bank loans. This improvement has been seen across the board in 
the corporate bond market, including financial corporations’ 
bonds and high-yield bonds.
Similarly, the programme has contributed to a reactivation of the 
primary market for non-financial corporation issuances. As Chart 2 
shows, the volume of euro-denominated issues by euro-area 
corporations has grown significantly. This was despite the 
slowdown in June, possibly as a result of the uncertainty created 
by the referendum in the United Kingdom. This growth in the 
volume of issuances seems to be due more to the larger size of 
issues than to an increase in the number of issues or in the new 
issuers (see Chart 3).5
In net terms, issues are contributing to sustaining an increase in 
corporate borrowing (see Chart 5) and may explain, at least in 
part, the contraction in bank lending of loans over a million 
euros (see Chart 6). The introduction of the CSPP is expected to 
have a positive side effect on the supply of bank loans to smaller 
firms as larger firms’ shift their financing decisions towards 
bond markets.
Overall, the additional easing of financing conditions and more 
vigorous lending this new monetary policy tool seems to have 
brought about should help support the economic recovery in the 
euro area and speed up inflation’s gradual return to rates 
compatible with the medium-term monetary policy target.
1  Namely, the third edition of the Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme  (CBPP3), the Asset Backed Securities Purchase 
Programme (ABSPP) and the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). 
The CBPP3 and the ABSPP were introduced in 2014, and are aimed, 
respectively, at covered bonds and simple, transparent securitisations of 
loans to businesses and households. The Eurosystem has been buying 
public sector bonds through the PSPP since March 2015.
2  See the box on “las nuevas medidas expansivas del Banco Central 
Europea” (available in Spanish only) in the March 2016 Economic Bulletin.
3  Issues by credit institutions and their subsidiaries, and by asset 
management companies created as a result of financial sector resolution 
and restructuring processes are excluded. For more information see 
“More details on the Eurosystem’s corporate sector purchase 
programme (CSPP) – Questions & answers” available at http://www.ecb.
europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/cspp-qa.en.html.
4  As in the case of the other private sector purchase programmes, the 
Eurosystem can buy up to 70% of an issue. This issue share limit is 
lower in the case of public undertakings, to which the same limit is 
applied as in the PSPP.
5  The chart was prepared with information from Dealogic, using the name 
of the parent company to identify new issues. Dealogic’s information is 
incomplete, particularly in the case of small issues, such that the data in 
the Chart may underestimate the importance of new issuers.
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CORPORATE DEBT ISSUES FOLLOWING THE LAUNCH OF THE ECB’S CSPP (cont’d)
SOURCES: European Central Bank, Datastream, Dealogic and JP Morgan.
a Issues by euro-area non-financial corporations (following the parent nationality criterion). Includes Corporate Bond Investment Grade, Corporate Bond High Yield 
and Medium Term Notes, following Dealogic nomenclature.
b Companies that have not previously issued bonds are considered "new entrants" by taking into account the name of the parent company.
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This box outlines the extent of Spain’s commercial and financial 
exposure to the United Kingdom with a view to giving a preliminary 
assessment of the Spanish economy’s possible vulnerabilities 
following the result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership in 
June. In terms of trade flows, Spanish exports of goods and 
services to Britain account for approximately 10% of the total and 
are worth 3.2% of GDP (see Chart 1). The figure for exports as a 
share of GDP is somewhat lower than the euro area average of 
4%. In particular, measured this way, Spain’s trade exposure is 
less both than that of Germany, with its outward looking economy, 
and that of smaller countries. The case of smaller countries is 
logical given the positive correlation usually found between an 
economy’s size and its degree of external openness. However, 
compared to France and Italy, which are of a similar size to Spain, 
its exposure to the United Kingdom is somewhat greater.
If this dependence of the various euro-area economies on the 
British economy is examined based on a breakdown into goods 
and services, certain clear differences emerge in Spain’s case. 
Specifically, services exports account for a bigger share of GDP in 
Spain than in the other major EMU economies, with the United 
Kingdom being the leading market for Spain’s products (30% of 
the total). This feature is apparent in the case of both tourism and 
non-tourism services.
In the specific case of tourism, the British economy accounts for 
21% of total receipts. Moreover, given the rapid growth rate in 
recent years, UK residents’ spending in Spain has been making a 
very strong contribution to the sector’s recent good performance 
(see Chart 2). The significance of non-tourism services exports to 
the United Kingdom is even greater (39% of the total), with 
telecommunications and financial services standing out, followed 
by transport and business services. This clearly reflects the 
presence of Spanish multinationals that have commercial ties with 
their head offices and other companies based in Spain.
The United Kingdom is less important in comparative terms as a 
destination for Spanish goods exports (accounting for around 7% 
of the total). Even so, it is still Spain’s fourth largest trading partner 
(after France, Germany and Italy). In the consumer goods category, 
the branches with the biggest exposures include the automotive 
industry (including parts), for which exports to the United Kingdom 
represent 12.7% of total sales abroad,, along with food, drink and 
tobacco, which account for 9.5% of the total. In the case of capital 
goods, air and non-rail terrestrial transport equipment stand out 
(with exports to the United Kingdom of 13.3% and 11% of the 
total, respectively).
Similarly, on the imports side, Spain’s purchases from the United 
Kingdom are less significant than in the euro area as a whole in the 
case of goods, but not in that of services. In any event, aggregate 
exposures in this case of both the Spanish (1.2% of GDP) and 
EMU economies (2.5%) are significantly smaller. Considering 
export and import flows together, Spain’s bilateral commercial 
transactions with the UK economy yield a surplus of almost 1.5% 
of GDP.
As in the case of trade, Spain’s financial exposure to the United 
Kingdom, although significant, is less than the euro area 
average, with the exception of direct investments (see Chart 3). 
In 2015, external assets and liabilities with the United Kingdom 
accounted for 11% and 8% of the total, respectively (15% and 
20% of GDP, such that Spain has a negative net international 
investment position (IIP) of 5% of GDP with Britain).1 In terms of 
currency type, most assets, and particularly liabilities, are 
denominated in euros, the net position in sterling being slightly 
positive.
Direct investments – at 8% of GDP – stand out among Spain’s 
assets in the United Kingdom (see Chart 4).2 In fact, the country is 
the top destination for Spanish foreign direct investment (FDI), 
followed by the United States and Brazil. As noted, Spanish FDI is 
concentrated in telecommunications and the financial sector. 
Other investments (i.e. basically deposits, loans and repos) come 
to 4% of GDP, largely as a reflection of financial investments by 
Spanish financial institutions in the British banking system, taking 
the form of deposits and other debt instruments. Portfolio 
investments in securities play a fairly minor role, and are 
concentrated in fixed income.
By contrast with Spain’s assets in the UK, British investments in 
Spain are more mixed. Here portfolio investment securities, 
primarily fixed income (7% of GDP according to the IMF’s final 
investor criterion), and other investments play a bigger role (also 
7% of GDP, but in this case based on the first counterparty 
criterion), in line with the City of London’s importance as an 
international financial centre (see Chart  5). Finally, according to 
data from the Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS), British 
shareholdings in Spanish firms are relatively small. Specifically, the 
United Kingdom’s direct investments in Spain in 2104 were 
equivalent to 2% of GDP.3 Apart from financial assets, British 
property investments in Spain are also significant. According to 
data from the Centro de Información Estadística del Notariado 
(CIEN), British buyers account for the largest share of total foreign 
purchases. Specifically, their investments in 2015 accounted for 
4% of all housing purchases. This percentage was higher still in 
certain geographical areas (such as the Mediterranean coast and 
the Canary and Balearic Islands) where there is a larger share of 
holiday homes (see Chart 6).
In short, the Spanish economy’s degree of exposure to that of the 
United Kingdom does not differ significantly from that of the other 
BOX 5THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S EXPOSURE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM
1  However, it should be noted that some liabilities are recognised 
according to the first-known counterparty, which may not be in the same 
country of the ultimate owner of the assets, such that this figure may 
differ from the real value.
2  The bulk of FDI assets (over 80% of the total) are in the form of shares 
and other equity.
3  According to data from the Foreign Investment Register, 
telecommunications and the tobacco industry were the biggest 
destinations of British direct investments (with 21% and 22%, 
respectively, of the total in 2013).
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main euro-area economies. Nevertheless, there are some specific 
areas, such as inward tourism, non-tourism services, and Spanish 
direct investment in certain sectors of the British economy 
(particularly finance and telecommunications), and second homes, 
where, in relative terms, the Spanish economy is more sensitive to 
developments in the United Kingdom.
BOX 5THE SPANISH ECONOMY’S EXPOSURE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM (cont’d)
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Since the second half of 2013, when the economic recovery 
began, the Spanish labour force participation rate has continued 
on the downward path that commenced in mid-2012 when it 
peaked at 60.5%. It is common in downturns for the participation 
rate to decline. This is usually attributed to the discouragement 
effect, i.e. as the unemployment rate and the average duration of 
unemployment rise, the unemployed become discouraged and 
give up looking for work, exiting the workforce. This effect 
generally reverses when the business cycle improves, so that 
increases in the employment rate tend to be accompanied by 
increases in the labour supply. However, in the current economic 
recovery in Spain, the participation rate has continued to decline, 
falling by slightly more than 0.5 pp to 59.4% since the employment 
creation process began. The pattern is particularly striking among 
Spanish men (see Chart  1), for whom the participation rate has 
decreased by 1.3 pp since the second half of 2013, despite their 
BOX 6RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARTICIPATION RATE
SOURCE: INE (Labour Force Survey).
a Population of 16 years and over.
b The 2016 figure is the y-o-y rate of change of the first half of the year.
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being one of the groups whose participation in the labour market 
usually shows a high correlation with the cycle.1 Also noteworthy 
is the participation rate of Spanish women, which has held steady 
around 51.7% in the same period, after more than four decades of 
continuous growth as Spanish women gradually joined the labour 
market.2 This box analyses the causes of these changes in the 
participation rate, in an attempt to determine whether they are 
permanent or temporary and thus assess the advisability of 
projecting these trends over the forecasting horizon.
By age group, the decline in the participation rate of Spanish 
nationals has been concentrated among young people (16 to 24 
years), although more recently it has also been observed, to a lesser 
extent, in the 25 to 34 age groups (see Charts 1.3 and 1.4). One 
factor that could explain this pattern is that, in light of the limited 
demand for labour with lower educational attainment levels,3 
younger people are either re-entering the education system, because 
of the lack of job opportunities, or deferring joining the labour market 
in order to acquire greater human capital (thus extending their 
education). Chart  1.6 illustrates the change in the numbers of 
economically inactive young people who are studying (whether in 
regulated or unregulated studies). In general, the chart shows that 
the number of economically inactive people who are studying has 
risen since the second half of 2013, especially in the 25 to 34 age 
groups when it is less frequent for people to be economically inactive 
because they are studying. Analysis of the type of studies undertaken 
shows a significant increase in general secondary education and 
tertiary education.4 Conversely, the participation rate is rising among 
all other age groups (see Charts 1.4 and 1.5). The link between the 
lower participation rate of young people in the labour market and 
their acquiring greater human capital, which appears to have a 
cyclical component insofar as it is related to job opportunities 
existing at a given time, would in any case have beneficial effects in 
the medium term, not only because the quality of labour will be 
higher, but also because people with higher educational attainment 
levels have higher participation rates throughout their life cycle.
One crucial element to explain the recent sluggishness of labour 
force participation is population ageing, in a setting in which the 
participation rate is defined as the number of persons over 16 years 
of age, thus including those over 64 years of age, for whom 
participation rates are extremely low.5 Indeed, as Chart  2 shows, 
over the last 15 years the older age groups, which are those with the 
lowest participation rates, have grown as a proportion of the total. 
Moreover, this process has intensified in recent years, when the 
share of workers over 64 has increased significantly (by more than 
2 pp in the last six years).6 To assess the potential impact of ageing 
on the aggregate participation rate, a counterfactual path has been 
prepared by setting the proportion of each age group as a percentage 
of the population at their 2007 level and applying the change in 
participation rates of each group. This gives us what would have 
been the aggregate participation rate had there been no change in 
the population structure by age since 2007. As Chart 3.1 shows, the 
participation rate of the population over 16 would have been almost 
2  pp higher with the 2007 population structure, which is a very 
BOX 6RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARTICIPATION RATE (cont’d)
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POPULATION BY AGE GROUPS IN 2002, 2007 and 2016
1  See Montero and Regil (2015), “La tasa de actividad en España: 
resistencia cíclica, determinantes y perspectivas futuras”, Banco de 
España Occasional Paper No. 1502.
2  Changes in the participation rate among working-age foreigners, who 
account for some 12% of the total working-age population, were also 
consistent with the sluggishness of the labour supply. The participation 
rate fell by almost 2 pp for foreign women, and by 1 pp for foreign men.
3  See Izquierdo, Puente and Font (2013): “Evolución del desajuste 
educativo entre la oferta y la demanda de trabajo en España”, Boletín 
Económico, June, Banco de España.
4  There is no clear pattern in the changes in the numbers of students 
enrolled in unregulated programmes (non-formal personal and vocational 
training programmes).
5  The participation rate of the 65 to 69 age group is barely over 5%, while 
for the over-70s it is 0.6%.
6  This demographic pattern coincides with the post-war generation 
(marked by a rising birth rate) reaching retirement age and the continuing 
entry into the labour market of those born in the 1990s (a period marked 
by a very low fertility rate).
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significant impact. Several recent studies have estimated a similar 
effect for the US economy, for example, Aaronson et al (2014)7 who 
found that approximately 1.5 pp of the decline in the participation 
rate between 2007 and 2014 is due to population ageing.
The apparent impact of population ageing on the participation rate 
is considerably lower when it is calculated using only the 
population between 16 and 64 years rather than the population 
over 16  years (see Chart  3.2), given that, as indicated earlier, 
participation rates among the over-64s are very low, since most of 
this population group are retired. In fact, for this definition of the 
participation rate, the effect of population ageing is virtually zero. 
Hence, for certain types of analysis, the usual definition of the 
participation rate may not be the most appropriate one.
Given the potential future impact of the ageing process, Charts 3.3 
and 3.4 illustrate the results of a projection exercise of labour force 
participation similar to that indicated above, but in this case setting 
participation rates by population group at their 2016 level and changing 
the future percentage weights of the population groups in accordance 
with the population projections of the National Statistics Institute (INE) 
up to 2020.8 As the charts show, the participation rate calculated using 
the population over 16 records a further decline of approximately 2 pp 
between 2016 and 2020, owing to the demographic changes resulting 
from ageing, whereas the participation rate calculated using the 
population between 16 and 64 years declines by just 1  pp. The 
quantitative significance of this demographic change in the past and its 
foreseeable continuation in the future mean that this factor should be 
taken into account in the projection exercise, automatically reducing 
the participation and unemployment rates projected to date.
BOX 6 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARTICIPATION RATE (cont’d)
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Participation rate setting the proportion of each population group at their 2007 level.
b Aggregate participation rate, calculated by setting the participation rate of each age group at their 2016 level and aggregating with the INE's population projections 
for the period 2017-2020.
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7  Aaronson, Cajner, Fallick, Galbis-Reig, Smith and Wascher (2014): 
“Labor force participation: recent developments and future prospects”, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2014. 8  Using the INE’s population projections published in October 2014.

